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A Moving Target Approach for Identifying Malicious Sensors in
Control Systems
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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of attack
identification in cyber-physical systems (CPS). Attack identifica-
tion is often critical for the recovery and performance of a CPS
that is targeted by malicious entities, allowing defenders to con-
struct algorithms which bypass harmful nodes. Previous work
has characterized limitations in the perfect identification of
adversarial attacks on deterministic LTI systems. For instance,
a system must remain observable after removing any 2q sensors
to only identify q attacks. However, the ability for an attacker to
create an unidentifiable attack requires knowledge of the system
model. In this paper, we aim to limit the adversary’s knowledge
of the system model with the goal of accurately identifying all
sensor attacks. Such a scheme will allow systems to withstand
larger attacks or system operators to allocate fewer sensing
devices to a control system while maintaining security. We
explore how changing the dynamics of the system as a function
of time allows us to actively identify malicious/faulty sensors
in a control system. We discuss the design of time varying
system matrices to meet this goal and evaluate performance in
deterministic and stochastic systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical system (CPS) security has become a
widely studied topic, both within industry and the research
community. Indeed, current and next generation cyber-
physical systems will pervade our critical infrastructures in-
cluding the electricity grid, water distribution systems, waste
management, smart buildings, and health care, providing
ample motivation for attackers to target CPS. Moreover, CPS
will consist of many heterogeneous systems and components,
thus providing adversaries an opportunity for attacks [1].
There have been several powerful attacks against CPS in-
cluding Stuxnet [2] and the Maroochy Shire incident [3].
Consequently, significant research effort has been geared
towards responding to attacks on CPS, with a focus on
integrity attacks where an adversary alters a subset of
control inputs and sensor measurements. Previous research
has characterized stealthy attack scenarios including zero
dynamic attacks [4], [5], false data injection attacks [6],
[7], covert attacks [8], and replay attacks [9], where an
adversary adversely affects a system without being detected.
Moreover, countermeasures have been developed to detect
stealthy attacks [10]–[14].
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While detection allows a defender to determine the pres-
ence of an adversary, it does not prescribe a solution to
maintain system performance. Thus, we aim to identify
malicious entities in the network so specialized and optimal
solutions can be developed to counter their presence.
Previous work has considered the problem of identifica-
tion in CPS. For instance, Pasqualetti et al. [5] define the
notion attack identifiability, provide algebraic conditions to
characterize when a system can identify q attacks on sensors
and actuators, and propose identification filters to carry out
this process. Also, Sundaram et al. [15] design an intrusion
detection system in a wireless control network to identify
malicious behavior at sensor nodes and provide graphical
conditions to determine when identification is possible.
Attack identification is closely tied to robust estimation
in the presence of sensor attacks [16]–[22]. Qualitatively,
by identifying sensor attacks, a defender can perform state
estimation by disregarding malicious sensors and carry-
ing out estimation schemes on trusted sensors. In fact, in
deterministic systems, the ability to perform perfect state
estimation in the presence of sensor attacks is equivalent
to being able to perform perfect identification [16].
The problem of robust state estimation in deterministic
systems is considered in [16]–[19]. For instance, in [16]
(and [17]) the authors characterize the number of attacked
sensors (and inputs) which can be tolerated while perform-
ing state estimation and propose a decoding algorithm to
recover the state. Next, Shoukry et al. [19] propose event
based algorithms to improve the efficiency of robust state
estimation. Additionally, Chong et al. [18] develop schemes
for robust estimation in deterministic continuous LTI systems
while formulating a notion of observability under attack.
The problem of robust estimation has also been considered
in stochastic and uncertain systems [20]–[22]. For instance,
Mishra et al. [20] propose robust estimation schemes in the
presence of Gaussian noise and characterize limitations in
estimation performance in the presence of attacks. Nakahira
et al. [21] consider robust estimation with bounded noise,
proposing a stable estimator in the presence of q attacks
provided that the system remains detectable after removing
any 2q sensors. Finally, Pajic et al. [22] demonstrate the
robustness of estimation schemes in the presence of attacks
even when there is uncertainty in the system model.
From previous work [5], [17]–[19] it can be shown that
there are fundamental limitations in the defender’s ability to
perform identification. For instance, given the presence of an
intelligent adversary, perfect identification of q attacks can
only be performed if the system is observable after removing
any 2q sensors. However, such intelligent adversaries require
knowledge of the system model. By limiting the attacker’s
knowledge of the model, we hope to identify all sensor
attacks. This will allow us to perform perfect estimation
in a deterministic system under q attacks if the system
is observable after removing any q sensors. To meet this
objective, we propose changing the dynamics of the system
model in a time varying fashion, unknown to the adversary.
A similar scheme is considered for the detection of integrity
attacks in [23]. The time varying dynamics act like a moving
target, preventing an information constrained adversary from
developing stealthy unidentifiable attacks. In this paper,
• We propose design considerations for the moving target,
which allow us to perfectly identify a class of nonzero
sensor attacks in deterministic systems.
• We show the moving target allows us to detect destabi-
lizing sensor attacks in stochastic systems.
• We construct an observer which allows us to identify
sensor attacks that cause unbounded estimation error.
The rest of the paper is summarized as follows. In section
II, we introduce the problem and results on identification.
In section III, we propose a moving target based formula-
tion to prevent unidentifiable attacks. Next, in section IV,
we consider deterministic identification and propose design
considerations for the moving target. After, in section V,
we consider the moving target approach for detecting false
data injection attacks. In section VI, we construct a robust
estimator which can only be destabilized by identifiable
sensor attacks. Section VIII concludes the paper.
Notation: Unless otherwise specified, the following notation
is used. xt1:t2 refers to the set {xt1 , xt1+1, · · · , xt2}. Xuv is
the entry at row u and column v of matrix X . X i is the ith
row of X . If V is a set of indices, XV are the rows of X
indexed by V . 1 is the indicator function. P(·) refers to the
power set. ‖ · ‖ is the l2 norm. {ak} defines a sequence.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND PREVIOUS RESULTS
In this section we introduce our system model. To begin
we model our system as a discrete time deterministic control
system under sensor attacks. Though this initial approach is
simple, we consider the stochastic case later in the paper.
The dynamics are given by
xk+1 = Axk +B(uk(y0:k)), yk = Cxk +Dd
a
k. (1)
where xk ∈ R
n is the state at time k, uk(y0:k) ∈ R
p is
the control input, and yk ∈ Rm are the sensor outputs. The
sensor outputs, yk, consist ofm scalar sensor outputs, defined
by the set S = {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
The adversary performs sensor integrity attack on an
ordered set K = {s1, s2, · · · , s|K|} ⊆ S using additive
inputs dak ∈ R
|K|, starting at time k = 0. Consequently,
we define D entrywise as
Duv = 1u=si,v=i. (2)
Note that D is fully determined by the set K . Implicitly, we
assume that the set of sensors which the adversary targets is
constant due to (ideally) the inherent difficulty in the task of
hijacking sensors. When performing an integrity attack, the
adversary’s goal is to adversely affect the physical system
by preventing proper feedback. In particular, a defender with
incorrect sensor measurements may not be able to perform
adequate state estimation and thus will not be able to apply
appropriate corrective measures to the system.
We assume that the defender knows the system dynamics
M = {A,B,C} as well as the input and output histories
given by u0:k and y0:k, but is unaware of the set K .
Furthermore, we assume that in the deterministic setup,
the defender is unaware of the initial state x0. Thus, the
defender’s information Ik at time k is given by
Ik = {M, u0:k−1, y0:k}. (3)
Remark 1: In the deterministic case, we explore attacks
where the defender has no knowledge of the initial state.
While this is certainly not realistic, the attack vectors devel-
oped in this scenario can still remain stealthy in a practical
stochastic setting if the adversary carefully ensures that his
initial attack inputs remain hidden by the noise of the system.
From a defender’s perspective it is important to identify
trusted sensor nodes. Estimation and control algorithms can
then be tuned to ignore attacked nodes. We note that the
problem of identifying malicious nodes is independent of
the control input, since the defender is aware of the model
and input history. Thus, in the ensuing discussions we will
disregard the control input so that
xk+1 = Axk, yk = Cxk +Dd
a
k. (4)
A. Previous Results in Identification
Previous work in CPS security has attempted to address
the problem of identifiability. We now revisit major results
when trying to identify malicious adversaries.
To begin, let y(x0, D(K)d
a
k, k) be the output signal asso-
ciated with (4) at time k with initial state x0 and attack
input Ddak on sensors K . We define an attack monitor
Ψ : y0:∞ → P({1, · · · ,m}) with the property that Ψ = K
if and only if K is the smallest set such that for all k ≥ 0
we have yk = y(x
∗
0, D(K)d
a
k, k) for some initial state x
∗
0.
Definition 2: Consider an attack {D(K)dak} on the sen-
sors in K , where we assume each sensor in K is attacked at
least once. Then {D(K)dak} is unidentifiable if Ψ(y0:∞) 6=
K . Moreover, the set K is unidentifiable if there exists an
unidentifiable attack [5].
Based on this definition we state an attack is unidentifiable
if there exists an attack on a different subset of sensors with
size less than or equal to |K|, which yields the same sensor
outputs. As a result, we have the following [5].
Theorem 3: An attack on sensors K1 is unidentifiable if
and only if there exists x10 and x
2
0 and set K2 such that
y(x10, D(K1)d
a
k, k) = y(x
2
0, D(K2)d¯
a
k, k), ∀ k. (5)
where |K2| ≤ |K1| and K2 6= K1.
In this setup, it is important to include the condition that
|K2| ≤ |K1|. Without this restriction, an attacker can
generate an unidentifiable attack regardless of the set K . In
particular, suppose D(K)dak = C
KAk∆x0. Then,
y(x0, D(K)d
a
k, k) = y(x0+∆x0, D(K
c)d¯ak, k), ∀ k. (6)
where D(Kc)d¯ak = −C
KcAk∆x0. We observe that there
exists an attack on sensors K equivalent to an alternative
attack on the complement set Kc. In such a scenario, it is
easy to see a defender can identify attacks on no more than
half the sensors. In fact, we have the following result [5].
Theorem 4: Attack set K1 is unidentifiable if and only if
[
λI −A 0 0
C D(K1) D(K2)
] xd1
d2

 =
[
0
0
]
, (7)
where K2 satisfies |K2| ≤ |K1| and K2 6= K1, λ ∈ C,
x 6= 0 ∈ Cn and d1 ∈ C
|K1| and d2 ∈ C
|K2|.
Corollary 5: [16] A system can identify attacks on up
to q arbitrary sensors if and only if (A,C) is 2q sparse
observable. That is, (A,C) remains observable if we remove
any 2q sensors.
As a consequence of the previous results, the defender must
allocate a large number of sensors to withstand a large
number of attacks or alternatively design systems, which are
only robust to a fewer attacks.
III. MOVING TARGET APPROACH FOR IDENTIFICATION
In the previous section we demonstrated that there exist
limitations on the number of attacks a defender can poten-
tially identify. Specifically, we saw that to identify all attacks
of size q, the system must be 2q sparse observable. This
can result in expenditures to add more sensing in order to
withstand more attacks or sacrificing security in order to use
fewer components. However, in this section we argue that
generating unidentifiable attacks requires knowledge of the
model. By limiting this knowledge, we hope to prevent such
attacks. To begin we define the following.
Definition 6: A nonzero attack on sensor s is unambigu-
ously identifiable at time t if there is no x∗0 ∈ R
n satisfying
ysk = y
s(x∗0, 0, k) for 0 ≤ k ≤ t. An attack on sensor s is
unambiguously identifiable if it is unambiguously identifiable
for all t.
The notion of unambiguous identifiability characterizes when
the defender can be certain that sensor s is faulty or under
attack. This scenario occurs only if there exists no initial
state which produces the output sequence at ys. We envision
designing a system that forces the attacker to generate
unambiguously identifiable attacks on all sensors which he
targets. Consequently, we can identify misbehaving sensors.
Thus, instead of requiring our system to be 2q sparse
observable to perform perfect estimation with q attacks or
2q detectable to perform stable estimation [21], forcing an
attacker to generate unambiguously identifiable attacks will
allow the defender to perform stable estimation when the
system is only q detectable (detectable after removing any q
sensors). This allows the system to withstand more powerful
attacks or use fewer sensing devices while maintaining the
same level of security. We now characterize attacks which
are not unambiguously identifiable.
Theorem 7: An attack on sensor s is not unambiguously
identifiable at time t if and only if there exists an x∗0 such
that Dsdak = C
sAkx∗0 for all 0 ≤ k ≤ t and C
sAkx∗0 6= 0
for some time 0 ≤ k ≤ t.
Proof: Suppose Dsdak = C
sAkx∗0 for time 0 ≤ k ≤ t.
Assume this attack is nonzero. Then, ysk = y
s(x0+x
∗
0, 0, k).
Suppose instead that there is no x∗0 such that D
sdak 6=
CsAkx∗0 for 0 ≤ k ≤ t . Then there is no x¯0 such that
yik + D
sdak = C
sAkx¯0. Since y
s(x0, 0, k) = C
sAkx0, the
result immediately follows.
As a result, to prevent attacks on sensor i from being
unambiguously identifiable at time k, an adversary must
insert attacks which lie in the image of Osk+1 given by
Osk+1 =
[
CsT (CsA)T · · · (CsAk)T
]T
. (8)
To insert such attacks, the adversary likely has to be aware
of both the matrix A and the matrix Cs. In the sequel, we
aim to minimize this knowledge to prevent an attacker from
generating unidentifiable attacks.
A. A moving target approach
Ideally, we would like to simply assume the adversary
has no knowledge of (A,C) and consequently will likely
always be unambiguously identifiable. However, in practice,
the processes associated with the physical plant may be well
known or previously public so that the attacker is aware of
(A,C). Alternatively, the defender can change parameters
of the system to ensure a knowledgeable adversary is still
thwarted. Specifically, we propose changing the system ma-
trix A and C in a time varying and unpredictable fashion
from the adversary’s point of view so that
xk+1 = Akxk, yk = Ckxk +Dd
a
k. (9)
We assume that
(Ak, Ck) ∈ Γ = {(A(1), C(1)), · · · , (A(l), C(l))}.
Theorem 8: An attack on sensor s in (9) is not unambigu-
ously identifiable at time t if and only if there exists an x∗0
such that Dsdak = C
s
k(
∏k−1
j=0 Aj)x
∗
0 for all time 0 ≤ k ≤ t
and Csk(
∏k−1
j=0 Aj)x
∗
0 6= 0 for some time 0 ≤ k ≤ t.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 7.
Changing the system matrices as a function of time allows
the system to act like a moving target. In particular, even
if an attacker is aware of the existing configurations of the
system, defined by Γ, he will likely be forced to generate
unambiguously identifiable attacks since he is not aware of
the sequence of system matrices. Moreover, since the system
matrices keep changing, it is unlikely the attacker can remain
unidentifiable by pure chance.
Remark 9: The matrices (Ak, Ck) can be changed ran-
domly using a cryptographically secure pseudo random num-
ber generator where the random seed is known both by the
defender and the plant, but is unavailable to the adversary.
From a security perspective, the seed would form the root of
trust. The set Γ can be obtained by leveraging or introducing
degrees of freedom in the dynamics and sensing in our
control system. While the defender likely would have to
change his control strategy to account for the time varying
dynamics, in this work, we will ignore such changes.
Given the proposed setup, we are now ready to define the
attacker’s information and an admissible attacker strategy.
Attacker Information
1) The adversary has no knowledge of either the input
sequence u0:k or the true output sequence.
2) Iak = {Γ, Dd
a
0:k−1, f({(Ak, Ck)})}.
If the adversary can observe the output sequence in a zero
input deterministic setting, he can multiply the true outputs
by some constant factor to avoid generating unambiguously
identifiable inputs. A realistic adversary may use physical
attacks to bias sensors without reading their outputs. Future
work will examine relaxing this assumption. The control
inputs are also secret so that the attacker will be unable to
leverage the input process to gain information about the sys-
tem model. However, we assume Γ is known as well as the
sequence of attack inputs. Also, the probability distribution
of the sequence of system matrices, f({(Ak, Ck)}), is public.
Definition 10: An admissible attack policy is a sequence
of deterministic mappings Ωk : Iak → Im(D(K)) such that
Ddak = Ωk(I
a
k ).
Here, we assume the attacker can only leverage his informa-
tion to construct a stealthy attack input. Consequently, while
there may exist attacks that bypass identification, in order to
be admissible, they must leverage the attacker’s knowledge
and can not be a function of unknown and unobserved
stochastic processes (namely the sequence of {Ak} and
{Ck}). A real adversarial strategy may be to bias sensors
with the goal of affecting state estimation, without being
identified by the defender. Thus, the adversary can impact
the system without corrective measures being put in place.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN FOR DETERMINISTIC
IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we consider criteria the defender can use to
design the set Γ, which can allow him to identify malicious
inputs on a subset of sensors. Given the attacker’s knowledge
of Γ, an adversary can guess the sequence of system matrices
chosen by the defender. If the adversary guesses correctly, he
can generate attacks which are not unambiguously identifi-
able. We would now like to characterize the scenario where
an attacker can guess the sequence of matrices incorrectly
yet still generate an unambiguously identifiable attack.
Theorem 11: Suppose an adversary generates an attack on
sensor s by guessing a sequence {lk} where li ∈ {1, · · · , l}
and creating inputs by applying Theorem 8. Specifically,
there exists an x10 such that D
sdak = C
s(lk)(
∏k−1
j=0 A(lj))x
1
0
for all time 0 ≤ k ≤ t and Dsdaη 6= 0 for some time
0 ≤ η ≤ t. Such a strategy may avoid generating an
unambiguously identifiable attack on sensor s at time t if
and only if
null
(
O(ls, t) O(s, t)
)
> null
(
O(ls, t)
)
+ null
(
O(s, t)
)
,
(10)
O(ls, t) =
[
(Cs(l0))
T · · · (Ci(lt)
∏t−1
j=0A(lj))
T
]T
,
O(i, t) =
[
(Cs0)
T (Cs1A0)
T · · · (Cst
∏t−1
j=0 Aj)
T
]T
,
where null refers to the dimension of the null space.
Proof: From Theorem 8, an attack is not unambigu-
ously identifiable at time t if and only if there exists some
x20 such that D
sdak = C
s
k(
∏k−1
j=0 Aj)x
2
0 for 0 ≤ k ≤ t
and this sequence is nonzero. Thus, the proposed strategy
can generate a nonzero unambiguously identifiable attack on
sensor i at time t if and only if
Cs(lk)

k−1∏
j=0
A(lj)

 x10 = Csk

k−1∏
j=0
Aj

x20,
for all 0 ≤ k ≤ t and moreover for some 0 ≤ k ≤ t this
expression is nonzero. The result immediately follows.
In practice, it is unlikely that the defender can change
the parameters of the system at each time step due to the
system’s inertia. Consequently, we would like to consider
systems where (Ak, Ck) remains constant for longer periods
of time. For now, we assume (Ak, Ck) ⊂ {Γ}, but is
constant. An adversary, can use his knowledge of Γ to guess
a pair (Ak, Ck) ∈ Γ and generate unidentifiable attack inputs.
Define the matrix
OSt,j =
[
CS(j)
T
(CS(j)A(j))T · · · (CS(j)A(j)t−1)T
]T
.
(11)
If the attacker guesses the matrices (A(j), C(j)) and
chooses to attack sensor s, he would need to ensure[
(Dsda0)
T · · · (Dsdat )
T
]T
lies in the image of Ost+1,j to
avoid deterministic identification. We next determine when
an attacker is able to guess an incorrect pair and avoid
generating an unambiguously identifiable attack.
Theorem 12: Suppose (A,C) = (A(1), C(1)) and an
adversary generates a nonzero attack input on sensor s using
(A(2), C(2)) by inserting attacks along the image of Ost,2.
Let Λ1 = {λ11, · · · , λ
1
q1
} be the set of distinct eivenvalues
associated with A(1) and Λ2 = {λ21, · · · , λ
2
q2
} be the set of
distinct eigenvalues of A(2). Let
{vλ,j1,1 , · · · v
λ,j
r1,1
, vλ,j1,2 , · · · v
λ,j
r2,2
, · · · , vλ,j1,lλ,j , · · · v
i,j
rlλ,j ,lλ,j
}
be a maximal set of linearly independent (generalized) eigen-
vectors associated with eigenvalue λ of A(j) satisfying
A(j)vλ,j1,l = λv
λ,j
1,l , A(j)v
λ,j
k+1,l = λv
λ,j
k+1,l + v
λ,j
k,l . (12)
Noting that each ri is in general fully determined by λ and
j, let r(λ) = maxi,j ri(λ, j). Define V
λ,j
s,k ∈ C
r(λ)×rk as


Cs(j)vλ,j1,k C
s(j)vλ,j2,k · · · · · · C
s(j)vλ,jrk,k
0 Cs(j)vλ,j1,k
. . .
. . .
...
0 0
. . .
. . .
...
0 0 · · · Cs(j)vλ,j1,k C
s(j)vλ,j2,k
0 0 0 0 Cs(j)vλ,j1,k
0 0 0 0 0


.
There exists an attack on sensor s, which is not unambigu-
ously identifiable for all time if and only if Λ1∩Λ2 6= ∅ and
there exist some λ ∈ Λ1 ∩ Λ2 such that
null
(
Vλ,1s V
λ,2
s
)
> null
(
Vλ,1s
)
+ null
(
Vλ,2s
)
,
where
Vλ,js =
(
V λ,js,1 · · · V
λ,j
s,lλ,j
)
.
Otherwise the attack can be detected in time t ≤ 2n− 1.
Proof: The proof is lengthy and found in [?] along with
numerical simulations.
The previous theorem gives the defender an efficient way
to determine if the attacker can guess Γ incorrectly yet
still remain undetected in the case that system matrices are
kept constant for at least a period of 2n time steps. It also
prescribes a means to perform perfect identification.
Design Recommendations
1) For all pairs i 6= j ∈ {1, · · · l}, Λi ∩ Λj = ∅.
2) The system matrices (Ak, Ck) are periodically changed
after every N ≥ 2n time steps.
3) Let {lk} be a sequence where lk ∈ {1, · · · , l}. Let qk
denote the indices of a subsequence. Pr((Aqk , Cqk) =
(A(lk), C(lk)), ∀k) = 0.
4) The pair (A(i), C(i)) is observable all i ∈ {1, · · · , l}.
5) For all i ∈ {1, · · · l}, 0 /∈ Λi.
Corollary 13: Assume a defender follows the design rec-
ommendations. Suppose sensor s is attacked and there is no
t∗ such that Dsdak = 0 for all k ≥ t
∗. Then, the sensor attack
will be unambiguously identifiable with probability 1.
Proof: Since the attack is persistently nonzero, the ad-
versary must guess a correct subsequence of system matrices
infinitely many times due to recommendations 1 and 2. From
recommendation 3, this occurs with probability 0.
As a result, an attacker who persistently biases a sensor
will be perfectly identified. Note that recommendation 3 can
be achieved with an IID assumption or an aperiodic and
irreducible Markov chain. The last 2 recommendations are
justified next when we consider stochastic systems.
V. FALSE DATA INJECTION DETECTION
In this section, we examine the effectiveness of the moving
target defense for detection in the case of a stochastic system.
Here, we assume that
xk+1 = Akxk + wk, yk = Ckxk +Dd
a
k + vk. (13)
wk and vk are IID Gaussian process and sensor noise where
wk ∼ N (0, Q) and vk ∼ N (0, R). For notational simplicity
we assume that the covariances Q ≥ 0 and R > 0 are
constant. However, we can obtain the ensuing results even
in the case that Q and R are dependent on Ak and Ck.
The adversary’s and defender’s information and strategy is
unchanged except we assume the defender has knowledge of
the distribution of the initial state. Specifically, f(x0|I−1) =
N (xˆ−0 , P0|−1). Moreover, both the defender and attacker are
aware of the noise statistics. We first would like to show that
a moving target defense leveraging the design recommen-
dations listed above can almost surely detect harmful false
data injection attacks. To characterize detection performance,
we consider the additive bias the adversary injects on the
normalized residues ∆zk due to his sensor attacks. The
residues, zk, are the normalized difference between the
observed measurements and their expected values. The bias
on the residues is given by
∆ek = (Ak−1 −KkCkAk−1)∆ek−1 −KkDd
a
k,
∆zk = P
− 12
k (CkAk−1∆ek−1 +Dd
a
k) , ∆e0 = 0,
Pk = (CkPk|k−1C
T
k +R), Kk = Pk|k−1C
T
k P
−1
k ,
Pk+1|k = Ak(Pk|k−1 −KkCkPk|k−1)A
T
k +Q, (14)
where ∆ek is the bias injected on the a posteriori state
estimation error obtained by an optimal Kalman filter, and
Pk|k−1 is the a priori error covariance. In [24], the authors
show through their study of information flows in control
systems that the residue bias in additive attacks is related
to the optimal decay rate for the probability of false alarm.
Theorem 14: Let 0 < δ < 1. Define αk and βk as the
probability of false alarm and detection respectively. Suppose
lim supk→∞
1
2(T+1)
∑T
k=0 ∆z
T
k∆zk ≥ ǫ. Then there exists
a detector such that
βk ≥ 1− δ, ∀k, lim supk→∞−
1
k+1 log(αk) ≥ ǫ.
Alternatively suppose y0:k is ergodic under attack and normal
operation and that limk→∞
1
2(T+1)
∑T
k=0∆z
T
k ∆zk ≤ ǫ.
Then for all detectors
βk ≥ 1− δ, ∀k =⇒ lim supk→∞−
1
k+1 log(αk) ≤ ǫ
We now show that an admissible adversary is restricted in
the bias he can inject on the state estimation error without
significantly biasing the residues and incurring detection. In
particular, we have the following result.
Theorem 15: Suppose a defender uses a moving
target defense leveraging the design recommendations
listed above. Then for all admissible attack strategies
lim supk→∞ ‖∆ek‖ =∞ =⇒ lim supk→∞ ‖∆zk‖ =∞.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that the residues are
bounded ‖∆zk‖ ≤ M . Define the indices of a peak sub-
sequence as follows. i0 = 0, ik = minκ such that κ >
ik−1, ‖∆eκ‖ > ‖∆et‖ ∀t ≤ κ. Such a sequence exists
since the estimation bias is unbounded. Also define the
indices jk such that jk = min κ such that jk ≥ ik, jk
mod N = N − 1 Observe that
∆ek = Ak−1∆ek−1 −KkP
1
2
k ∆zk. (15)
As a result, we have
Ajk∆ejk = A
jk−ik+1
ik
∆eik −
jk∑
t=ik+1
Ajk+1−tik KtP
1
2
t ∆zt.
Define am > 0 and aM > 0 as
am , min
j∈{1,··· ,l}
q∈{0,··· ,N}
σmin(A(j)
q), aM , max
j∈{1,··· ,l}
q∈{0,··· ,N−1}
‖A(j)q‖.
where σmin(·) denotes the smallest singular value. Moreover
let pM and cM be given by
pM = sup
k
‖Pk|k−1‖, cM = max
j∈{1,··· ,l}
‖C(j)‖.
Observe that am is nonzero since each A(i) is invertible
from recommendation 5. aM and cM are bounded above
since we are taking the maximum over a finite set of
bounded elements. Moreover, pM is bounded above since the
error covariance is bounded above. A complete argument is
omitted due to space considerations. However, since all pairs
(A(i), C(i)) ∈ Γ are observable from recommendation 4 it
can be shown that xNk+n, k ∈ N is a linear combination
of yNk:Nk+n−1 and 2n random variables, where the linear
combination is dependent only on (A(Nk), C(Nk)). Thus,
the covariance of xNk+n given y0:Nk+n−1 is bounded. It can
be shown that the covariance of xNk+n+j , j ∈ {1, · · · , N −
1} is bounded given y0:Nk+n+j−1 simply by computing
predictive covariances given y0:Nk+n−1. As a result, we have
‖Ajk∆ejk‖ ≥ am‖∆eik‖ − (N − 1)aMpMcM
M√
λmin(R)
.
where λmin(R) is the smallest eigenvalue of R.
Therefore, since ‖∆eik‖ → ∞, we have that
‖Ajk∆ejk‖ → ∞. Now, with some abuse of notation
let Ddat1:t2 =
[
(Ddat1 )
T · · · (Ddat2)
T
]T
. Suppose
(Ajk+1 , Cjk+1) = (A(q1), C(q1)). Then,
Ddjk+1:jk+N = O
S
N,q1
Ajk∆ejk + Fjk+1(q1)∆z
(q1)
jk+1:jk+N
.
Through a similar analysis as done above, it can shown that
‖Fjk+1(q1)‖ is bounded above. Alternatively, if q1 6= q2, is
chosen then
Ddjk+1:jk+N = O
S
N,q2
Ajk∆ejk + Fjk+1(q2)∆z
(q2)
jk+1:jk+N
.
Thus, to insert valid inputs for system states q1 and q2, we
require
(OSN,q1 −O
S
N,q2
)Ajk∆ejk = Fjk+1(q2)∆z
(q2)
jk+1:jk+N
− Fjk+1(q1)∆z
(q1)
jk+1:jk+N
.
The right hand side is bounded since ∆zjk+1:jk+N and
Fjk+1(q1) are bounded. Due to design recommendations 1
and 2 and Theorem 12, there is no solution to 0 6= OSN,q1v1 =
OSN,q1v2. As a result, since Aik∆ejk is unbounded and
each (Ak, Ck) pair is observable, (OSN,q1 − O
S
N,q2
) has no
nontrivial null space and the left hand side is unbounded.
Thus, there is no way for the attacker to guess incorrectly
and insert bounded residues. From, recommendation 3, there
is a nonzero probability the attacker guesses (Ajk+1, Cjk+1)
incorrectly and the result holds.
Remark 16: From the proof of Theorem 15, it can be seen
that the error covariance associated with the moving target
remains bounded since each system state is observable. Thus,
some estimation performance is guaranteed. Moreover, since
the system matrices are kept constant for a period of time,
the worst case error covariance, will practically be close to
the worst case LTI steady state covariance associated with
the pairs (A(j), C(j)) ∈ Γ and Q and R.
Remark 17: Design recommendation 1 can be relaxed
in the stochastic case for purposes of detecting false data
injection attacks. In particular for all non-equal pairs i, j ∈
{1, · · · , l} we only require 0 6= OSN,iv 6= O
S
N,jv for all v
instead of 0 6= OSN,ivi 6= O
S
N,jvj for all vi, vj . Here, a big
difference is that in the stochastic case we give the defender
some knowledge of the distribution of the initial state.
VI. ROBUST ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION
While the moving target approach guarantees we can
detect unbounded false data injection attacks, we wish to
also identify specific malicious sensors as in the deterministic
case. In the remainder of this section, we construct a robust
estimator. We will fuse state estimates generated by individ-
ual sensors since previous results [25], [26] suggest such an
estimator has better fault tolerance. This is desirable in our
work since we are attempting to force a normally stealthy
adversary to generate faults. We will show that an attacker
can destabilize this estimator only if the culprit sensors can
be identified. In particular, we will show that the estimation
error will become unbounded only if the bias on a sensor
residue is also unbounded.
To begin, we assume that for each sensor s,
NS(Osn,1) = NS(O
s
n,2) = · · · = NS(O
s
n,l), (16)
where NS(A) denotes the null space of A. Such a condition
is realistic since it implies that changing the system dynamics
does not affect what portion of the state the sensor itself
can observe. As a result, using the Kalman decomposi-
tion, for each sensor s, there exists a state transformation
Ts = [T
uo
s T
o
s ] such that [T
uo
s T
o
s ]
[
ζuo Tk,s ζ
T
k,s
]T
= xk and
[T uos T
o
s ]
[
ω1 Tk,s ω
T
k,s
]T
= wk. Here, the columns of T
uo
s are
a basis for NS(Osn,1).
Moreover, using the same transform Ts, there exists a
Γs = {(Cs(1), As(1)), · · · (Cs(l), As(l))} corresponding to
Γ such that
ζk+1,s = Ak,sζk,s + ωk,s, y
s
k = Ck,sζk,s + v
s
k, (17)
where each pair (Ak,s, Ck,s) is observable and belongs to Γ
s.
By performing a change of variables on xˆ−0 , a Kalman filter
with bounded covariance (see remark 16) can be constructed
to estimate ζk,i given y
i
0:k. Specifically, define[
−
ζˆ−0,s
]
, T−1s xˆ
−
0 ,
[
− −
− Qs1,s2
]
, T−1s1 QT
−1 T
s2
(18)
[
− −
− P s1,s20|−1
]
, T−1s1 P0|−1T
−1 T
s2
(19)
Then we have
ζˆk,s = (I −Kk,sCk,s)ζˆ
−
k,s +Kk,sy
s
k, (20)
Kk,s = P
s,s
k|k−1C
T
k,s(Ck,sP
s,s
k|k−1C
T
k,s +Rss)
−1
P s1,s2k = (I −Kk,s1Ck,s1)P
s1,s2
k|k−1(I −Kk,s2Ck,s2)
T
+Kk,s1Rs1s2K
T
k,s2
,
P s1,s2
k+1|k = Ak,s1P
s1,s2
k A
T
k,s2
+Qs1,s2 , ζˆ
−
k+1,s = Ak,sζˆk,s,
zk,s = (Ck,sP
s,s
k|k−1C
T
k,s +Rss)
− 12 (ysk − Ck,sζˆ
−
k,s),
Here ζˆk,s = E[ζk|ys0:k], ζˆ
−
k,s = E[ζk|y
s
0:k−1] are opti-
mal estimates of the reduced state for sensor s. Moreover,
P s1,s2k , P
s1,s2
k+1|k are a posteriori and a priori error covariances
associated with ζˆk,s1 , ζˆk,s2 and ζˆ
−
k,s1
, ζˆ−k,s2 given by
P s1,s2k = E[ek,s1e
T
k,s2
|ys10:k, y
s2
0:k],
P s1,s2
k|k−1 = E[e
−
k,s1
e−Tk,s2 |y
s1
0:k−1, y
s2
0:k−1],
where ek,s = ζk,s − ζˆk,s and e
−
k,s = ζk,s − ζˆ
−
k,s. We would
like to use the individual state estimates ζˆk,s associated with
each sensor s to obtain an overall state estimate of xk. To
do this, first define xok,s as
xok,s = T
o
s ζˆk,s + ηk,s (21)
where ηk,s is an IID sequence of Gaussian random variables
with ηk,s ∼ N (0, ǫI) for some small ǫ > 0. Moreover
{ηk,s1} and {ηk,s2} are independent sequences. ηk,s is a
mathematical artifact introduced so the subsequent estimator
has a simplified closed form and can be easily removed or
mitigated by letting ǫ tend to 0. Now, we observe that
xk = T
uo
s ζ
uo
k,s + x
o
k,s + T
o
s ek,s − ηk,s. (22)
From here we obtain
yˆk =Wxk + ηk, (23)
yˆk =


xok,1
xok,2
· · ·
xok,m

 , xk =


ζuok,1
ζuok,2
...
ζuok,m
xk


, ηk =


−T o1 ek,1 + ηk,1
−T o2 ek,2 + ηk,2
...
−T omek,1 + ηk,m

 ,
W =


−T uo1 0 · · · 0 I
0 −T uo2 · · · 0 I
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · −T uom I




ζuok,1
ζuok,2
...
ζuok,m
xk


.
It can be seen that ηk is normally distributed so that ηk ∼
N (0,Q), where Q > 0 consists of m×m blocks where the
(i, j) block is given by (T oi P
i,j
k T
oT
j +δijǫI). Here, δij is the
Kronecker delta. The minimum variance unbiased estimate
(MVUB) [27] of xk given yˆk is given by
xˆk = (W
TQ−1W )−1WTQ−1yˆk (24)
The last n entries of xˆk, denoted as xˆ
∗
k, constitute a (MVUB)
estimate of xk given the set of sensor estimates yˆk. The
covariance of this estimate is given by
cov(xk − xˆk) = (W
TQ−1W )−1. (25)
The proposed estimator is well defined since NS(W ) = 0.
If, W had a nontrivial null space, this would imply there
exists x 6= 0 and ζ1, · · · , ζm such that
T uoi ζi = x, ∀ i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. (26)
This would imply that ∩mi=1NS(O
i
n,1) 6= 0, which contra-
dicts the observability of each pair (Ak, Ck). We next show
that the proposed estimator of xk has bounded covariance.
Theorem 18: Consider the estimator of xk defined by
(20),(21),(23),(24). The estimator has bounded covariance.
Proof: We first prove thatQ > 0 is bounded above. The
ith diagonal block of Q has covariance (T oi P
i,i
k T
oT
i + ǫI).
Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 15, we
see that P i,ik is bounded. Consequently (T
o
i P
i,i
k T
oT
i + ǫI)
and Q are bounded.
Next consider xˆuw
k
= (WTW )−1WT yˆk. Since xk −
xˆuw
k
= −(WTW )−1WT ηk, xˆuwk is an unbiased estima-
tor of xk with covariance (W
TW )−1WTQW (WTW )−1.
Since W is fixed and Q > 0 is bounded above,
(WTW )−1WTQW (WTW )−1 is also bounded above.
Finally, since the proposed estimator is MVUB, we see
tr
(
(WTQ−1W )−1
)
≤ tr
(
(WTW )−1WTQW (WTW )−1
)
.
Thus, cov(xk− xˆk) and the covariance of xk defined by the
last n× n block of cov(xk − xˆk) are bounded.
To close this section, we demonstrate that the proposed
estimator is sensitive to biases in individual residues ∆zk,s,
specifically showing that an infinite bias introduced into the
estimator implies that the residues are also infinite. Define
ek , xk− xˆk and ∆ek as the bias inserted on ek due to the
adversary’s inputs. Moreover, let e∗k = xk − xˆ
∗
k and let ∆e
∗
k
and ∆ek,i be the bias inserted on e
∗
k and ek,i respectively
due to the adversary’s inputs. We have the following result.
Theorem 19: Consider the estimator of xk defined by
(20),(21),(23),(24). Then lim supk→∞ ‖∆e
∗
k‖ = ∞ =⇒
lim supk→∞ ‖∆z
i
k‖ =∞ for some i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
Proof: First, we observe that
ek = −(WTQ−1W )−1WTQ−1ηk. As a result,
∆ek = (W
TQ−1W )−1WTQ−1Tdiag∆ek,S . (27)
where
Tdiag =


T o1 0 · · · 0
0 T o2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · T om

 , ∆ek,S =


∆ek,1
∆ek,2
...
∆ek,m

 .
Next, we will show that K∗ =
(WTQ−1W )−1WTQ−1Tdiag has bounded norm. In
particular observe that
‖K∗‖ = ‖(WT
Q−1
‖Q−1‖
W )−1WT
Q−1
‖Q−1‖
Tdiag‖
≤ ‖(WT
Q−1
‖Q−1‖
W )−1‖‖WT
Q−1
‖Q−1‖
Tdiag‖.
Clearly, ‖WT Q
−1
‖Q−1‖Tdiag‖ has bounded norm. Moreover,
using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 18,
‖(WT Q
−1
‖Q−1‖W )
−1‖ has bounded norm. Thus, ‖K∗‖ is
bounded. Consequently, from (27), lim supk→∞ ‖∆e
∗
k‖ =
∞ =⇒ lim supk→∞ ‖∆ek,i‖ = ∞ for some i ∈
{1, · · · ,m}. However, from Theorem 15, this implies
lim supk→∞ ‖∆z
i
k‖ =∞ and the result holds.
While the proposed estimator does not guarantee each ma-
licious sensor will be identified, it does guarantee that the
defender will be able to identify and remove sensors whose
attacks cause unbounded bias in the estimation error simply
by analyzing each sensor’s measurements individually. This
is due to the fact that the bias on residues of such sensors
will grow unbounded, which can be easily detected by some
χ2 detector. As a result, for each individual sensor s, we
propose the following detector at time k, which can be used
to identify malicious behavior,
k∑
j=k−T∗+1
z2j,s
Hs1
≷
Hs0
γ. (28)
In this scenario, Hs1 is the hypothesis that sensor s is
malfunctioning and Hs0 is the hypothesis that sensor s is
working normally. In practice a sensor s who repeatedly fails
detection can be removed from consideration when obtaining
a state estimate and the proposed fusion based estimation
scheme can be adjusted accordingly.
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We consider a numerical example where l = 7 and A(j)
and C(j) are given by
A(k) =


A11(j) A12(j) 0 0 0
0 A22(j) 0 A24(j) 0
0 0 A33(j) 0 A35(j)
0 0 0 A44(j) A45(j)
0 0 0 0 A55(j)

 ,
C(j) =
[
C1(j)
C2(j)
]
,
Ci(j) =


C1,i(j) 0 0 0 0
0 C2,i(j) 0 0 0
0 0 C3,i(j) 0 0
0 0 0 C4,i(j) 0
0 0 0 0 C5,i(j)

 .
where Aij(j) ∈ R
3×3 and Ci,j(j) ∈ R
1×3 are scaled
uniformly random matrices with Aii(j) unstable. Moreover
Q and R are appropriately sized matrices generated by
multiplying a uniform random matrix by its transpose. The
system matrices are changed independently and randomly
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Fig. 1. Expected mean squared error vs time under normal operation for
proposed fusion based estimator and the centralized Kalman filter.
every 2n time steps where n = 15 and each (A(j), C(j))
pair has equal likelihood.
We assume that the adversary biases the last 5 sensors
(measured by C2(j)) by performing the attack formulated in
Theorem 8. Here, the attacker guesses the system matrices
randomly every 2n time steps and x∗0 is chosen identically
for each sensor. A χ2 detector (28) with window 5 and false
alarm probability αik = 6.9× 10
−8 is implemented for each
sensor based on their local Kalman filters. A centralized χ2
detector with window 3 derived from the optimal centralized
Kalman filter performs detection with false alarm probability
αk = 4.2× 10−4.
In Fig. 1, we compared the optimal Kalman filter and the
proposed fusion based estimator under normal operation by
plotting their expected mean squared error as a function of
time. The estimators achieve similar performance, with the
average mean squared of the optimal Kalman filter at 22.9
and the average mean squared error of the proposed estimator
at 23.4.
In Fig. 2 and 3, we consider the system with the moving
target under attack. However, we assume the attacker is aware
of the exact sequence of time varying matrices. As such the
attacker is able to destabilize the estimation error in Fig. 2
while the sensor residues appear normal in Fig. 3.
Finally, in Fig. 4, we plot the norm of the estimation error
for both the proposed estimator and optimal Kalman filter as
a function of time when the attacker is forced to randomly
guess the system model. Here the attacker is detected in 2
time steps and perfectly identified in 10 time steps. When a
sensor is identified, it is removed from consideration when
performing fusion or optimal Kalman filtering. It can be seen
that while under attack, the proposed fusion based estimator
is better able to recover from the adversary’s actions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider a moving target approach for
identifying sensor attacks in control systems. We first consid-
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Fig. 2. Estimation error vs time under attack when the adversary knows
the system dynamics.
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Fig. 4. Estimation error vs time under attack when the adversary does
not know the true dynamics. All sensor attacks are identified. The proposed
fusion based estimator and the centralized Kalman filter are illustrated.
ered the deterministic case and examined design considera-
tions which ensure perfect identification. We then considered
the stochastic scenario and showed that the proposed solution
can effectively prevent infinite false data injection attacks.
Finally, we constructed a robust estimator, which allows
us to identify sensors which cause unbounded estimation
error. Future work consists in examining and evaluating a
larger class of estimators in the stochastic case including the
traditional Kalman filter. Furthermore, we wish to investigate
the amount of bias the attacker can introduce into the esti-
mation error while avoiding identification with tests on real
systems. Finally, we wish to consider more powerful adaptive
adversaries who observe a subset of sensor measurements
and perform system identification.
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IX. APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 12
We first proof sufficiency. Suppose ∃λ ∈ Λ1 ∩ Λ2 and
α1 ∈ C
∑
i
ri(λ,1), α2 ∈ C
∑
i
ri(λ,2) such that
Vλ,1s α1 = V
λ,2
s α2 6= 0. (29)
Let V¯ λ,j be given by[
vλ,j1,1 · · · v
λ,j
r1,1
· · · vλ,j1,lλ,j · · · v
i,j
rlλ,j ,lλ,j
]
and let xa0(j) = V¯
λ,jαj . Suppose
Dsdak(j) = C
s(j)A(j)kxa0(j)
= λkVλ,js,1 αj + · · ·+
1
(k − 1)!
dk−1
dλk−1
(λk)Vλ,js,kαj , k ≤ r(λ)
= λkVλ,js,1 αj + · · ·+
1
(r(λ) − 1)!
dr(λ)−1
dλr(λ)−1
(λk)Vλ,j
s,r(λ)αj ,
k > r(λ), (30)
where Vλ,js,k is the kth row of V
λ,j
s . From (29), D
sdak(1) =
Dsdak(2). Note that if D
sdak(j) is not real, then an attack
can be constructed by adding the conjugate so that
Dsdak(j) = C
s(j)A(j)kxa0(j) + C
s(j)A(j)kxa0(j)
= Cs(j)A(j)k(xa0(j) + x
a
0(j))
Therefore,
Cs(1)A(1)k(xa0(1)+x
a
0(1)) = C
s(2)A(2)k(xa0(2)+x
a
0(2)).
The attack can be scaled so it is nonzero for some time k
from (30) and (29). Thus, the result holds.
We now prove the necessary assumption. Without
loss of generality, suppose the first z eigenvalues of
Λ1 and Λ2 are the same so that λ1k = λ
2
k for
k ≤ z. Assume the rest of the eigenvalues are
different. In particular let Λ1 = {λ1, · · · , λq1} and
Λ2 = {λ1, · · · , λz, λq1+1, · · · , λq1+q2−z}. Let r
∗(λ, j) =
maxi ri(λ, j), characterize the maximum block size of eigen-
value λ for A(j) and let τ + 1 ≥ 2n.
Define G(λi, j) ∈ Cτ+1×r
∗(λi,j) as


1 0 · · · 0
λi 1 · · · 0
λ2i 2λi · · · 0
...
... · · ·
...
λτi τλ
τ−1
i · · ·
1
(r∗(λi,j)−1)!
dr
∗(λi,j)−1
dr∗(λi,j)−1
(λτi )


. (31)
where the kth column is obtained by taking entrywise, the
corresponding (k − 1) derivative of the associated entry in
the first column and dividing by (k− 1)!. Let Ga, Gb, Gc be
given by
Ga =
[
G(λ1, 1) G(λ1, 2) · · · G(λz , 1) G(λz , 2)
]
,
Gb =
[
G(λz+1, 1) · · · G(λq1 , 1)
]
,
Gc =
[
G(λq1+1, 2) · · · G(λq1+q2−z , 2)
]
.
Finally, let G∗ =
[
Ga Gb Gc
]
. Note that G∗ ∈ Cτ+1×κ
where κ ≤ 2n by construction.
Consider vectors ηi,j ∈ C
∑
k
rk(λi,j) and define
V˜λi,js , V˜
a
s , V˜
b
s , V˜
c
s , V˜s as
V˜λi,js =
[
Vλi,js,1 η
i,j · · · Vλi,j
s,r∗(λi,j)
ηi,j
]T
,
V˜as =
[
(V˜λ1,1s )
T (V˜λ1,2s )
T · · · (V˜λz ,1s )
T (V˜λz ,2s )
T
]T
,
V˜bs =
[
(V˜
λz+1,1
s )T · · · (V˜
λq1 ,1
s )T
]T
,
V˜cs =
[
(V˜
λq1+1,2
s )T · · · (V˜
λq1+q2−z,2
s )T
]T
,
V˜s =
[
(V˜as )
T (V˜bs)
T (V˜cs )
T
]
.
It can be shown (Theorem 11) that an attack exists only
if there exists some nontrivial V˜s in the null space of
G∗. We observe by construction that G∗ has rmin =∑z
i=1minj r
∗(λi, j) pairs of identical columns. Thus,
null(G∗) ≥ rmin. Let G˜∗ ∈ Cτ+1×rmax be obtained by
deleting duplicate columns of G∗ where rmax ≤ 2n ≤ τ +1
is given by
z∑
i=1
max
j
r∗(λi, j) +
q1∑
i=z+1
r∗(λi, 1) +
q2+q1−1∑
i=q1+1
r∗(λi, 2).
Let G˜∗trunc be a square matrix obtained by removing the
last τ + 1− rmax rows of G˜∗.
We first show that the null space G˜∗
T
trunc is empty.
Suppose it was not. This would imply the existence of a
complex nonzero polynomial p∗(x) of degree rmax with the
property
p∗(λk) = 0, · · · ,
d(maxj r
∗(λk,j)−1)p∗
dx
(λk) = 0,
for 1 ≤ k ≤ z,
p∗(λk) = 0,
dp∗
dx
(λk) = 0, · · · ,
dr
∗(λi,1)−1p∗
dx
(λk) = 0,
for z + 1 ≤ k ≤ q1, and
p∗(λk) = 0,
dp∗
dx
(λk) = 0, · · · ,
dr
∗(λi,2)−1p∗
dx
(λk) = 0,
for q1 + 1 ≤ k ≤ q1 + q2 − z.
But this contradicts the fundamental theorem of algebra
since it would imply a polynomial of degree τ has τ + 1
zeros. Thus, the null space G˜∗
T
trunc is empty.
Therefore, by the rank nullity theorem G˜∗trunc is full rank
and therefore G˜∗ is full rank. Consequently, rank(G∗) ≥
rmax. However, null(G
∗) ≥ rmin and the number of
columns in G∗ is rmax + rmin. Therefore, strict equality
holds and rank(G∗) = rmax and null(G
∗) = rmin. As a
result, one excites the null space of G∗ only by exciting
pairs of identical columns in G∗.
Therefore, V˜s is in the null space of G∗ only if for 1 ≤
k ≤ z
V˜λk,1s = −V˜
λk,2
s .
However, there exists a nonzero attack only if for some k
there exists a solution
V˜λk,1s = −V˜
λk,2
s 6= 0.
The result directly follows.
